Abstract. In this paper we study a differential fault attack against the Grain family of stream ciphers. The attack works due to certain properties of the Boolean functions and corresponding choices of the taps from the LFSR. The existing works, by and Karmakar et al. (2011) , are applicable only on Grain-128 exploiting certain properties of the combining Boolean function h. That idea could not easily be extended to the corresponding Boolean function used in Grain v1. Here we show that the differential fault attack can indeed be efficiently mounted for the Boolean function used in Grain v1. In this case we exploit the idea that there exists certain suitable α such that h(x) + h(x + α) is linear. In our technique, we present methods to identify the fault locations and then construct set of linear equations to obtain the contents of the LFSR and the NFSR. As a countermeasure to such fault attack, we provide exact design criteria for Boolean functions to be used in Grain like structure.
Introduction
The Grain v1 stream cipher is in the hardware profile of the eStream portfolio [1] that has been designed by Hell, Johansson and Meier in 2005 [15] . It is a synchronous bit oriented stream cipher, although it is possible to achieve higher throughput at the expense of additional hardware. The physical structure of Grain is simple as well as elegant and it has been designed so as to require low hardware complexity. Following certain attacks on the initial design of the cipher, the modified versions Grain v1 [15] , Grain-128 [16] and Grain-128a [2] were proposed after incorporating certain changes. Analysis of this cipher is an area of recent interest in as evident from numerous cryptanalytic results related to this family [3-5, 8-13, 19, 20, 22, 23, 27, 28] .
Fault attacks are known to be very efficient against stream ciphers in general, and have received a lot of attention in recent cryptographic literature [6, 7, 17, 18, 21] . For differential fault attack scenario in stream ciphers, the attacker is allowed to inject faults in the internal state. Then by analyzing the difference in the faulty and the fault-free keystreams, one should be able to deduce the complete or partial information about the internal state/secret key. The most common method of injecting faults is by using laser shots or clock glitches [24, 25] . Though the fault attacks usually rely on optimistic assumptions and study the cipher in a model that is weaker than the original version, they are not unrealistic as evident from literature. In this paper too, the model we study is a follow up of existing state-of-the-art literature [5, 19] . A detailed justification of the feasibility of such fault model is presented in [5, Section IIIB] . Before proceeding further, let us now present the fault model.
1. Similar to [5] , we consider that the attacker is able to reset the system with the original Key-IV and start the cipher operations again. The work [19] requires a different assumption, where the IVs need to be modified in each initialization. 2. The attacker can inject a fault at any one random bit location of the LFSR or NFSR. As a result of the fault injection, the binary value in the bit-location (where the fault has been injected) is toggled. The attacker is not allowed to choose the location where he wants to inject the fault. However, as assumed in both [5, 19] the fault in any bit may be reproduced at any later stage of operation, once injected. 3. Similar to [5] , we inject faults in the LFSR only, whereas the NFSR has been used for fault injection in [19] . 4 . The attacker has full control over the timing of fault injection, i.e., it is possible to inject the fault precisely at any stage of the cipher operation.
Our Contribution. Grain-128 has been successfully cryptanalyzed by employing fault attacks [5, 19] . However, Grain-v1 employs Boolean function of different kind, and thus such fault attacks may not immediately work against this cipher. In this paper we have tried to explore a generic fault attack on the structure of the Grain family of stream ciphers and thus in particular the idea works for Grain v1 too. The works presented in [5, 19] exploited the fact that the Boolean function g in Grain-128 is quadratic and the function h has only one cubic term other than the quadratic terms. This is not the scenario in Grain v1, where the Boolean functions are of more complicated structure in their Algebraic Normal Form. We point out that there are still problems in the choice of such functions as in Grain v1 [15] and suggest suitable choice instead of that one. The novel idea of our fault attack is based on certain specific observations related to the output Boolean function h. For Grain v1, h is a 5-variable function with the differential property that h(s 0 , s 1 ) = 1. This helps us in determining the NFSR bits. To highlight our contribution in this paper, we like to refer to the following comment from [19] : "The attack may be extended to Grain-like ciphers with higher degree feedback functions and output functions. However, determining fault locations can be a challenging task if linear terms are removed from output bit expression. Higher degree feedback functions and output functions will however certainly increase the attack complexity as mostly nonlinear equations will be obtained."
We show that the complexity of the attack is not exactly related to the degree of the output functions. A q-variable Boolean function (say, h : {0, 1} q → {0, 1}) with high degree can also be attacked in a similar manner if there exists certain suitable α ∈ {0, 1} q such that h(x) + h(x + α) is linear. That is, higher degree functions may not increase the attack complexity as linear equations may actually be available using clever techniques instead of nonlinear ones.
An integral part of any fault attack is to identify the register location where the fault has been injected. We outline a novel technique of identifying the fault location in the LFSR by using an optimal length Signature vector technique.
We also point out that there exists a pool of 5-variable Boolean functions which are of matching parameters as proposed in [15] and possess additional properties that help in resisting the kind of differential fault attack that we describe here. That is, we present specific countermeasures to this kind of fault attack that relies on proper choice of the nonlinear combining Boolean function.
Organization of this paper. In this section, we proceed with the details of the Grain family (in particular Grain v1). Next, in Section 2, we present a broad description of the actual attack. The implementation of the attack on Grain v1 along with the fault location identification routine is explained in Section 3. The countermeasure corresponding to this attack with respect to proper choice of Boolean functions is described in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
We abuse the + notation for Boolean XOR, i.e., GF(2) addition as well as standard arithmetic addition. However, that will be clear from the context.
Brief Description of Grain Family
The exact structure of the Grain family is explained in Figure 1 . It consists of an n-bit LFSR and an n-bit NFSR. Certain bits of both the shift registers are taken as inputs to a combining Boolean function, whence the keystream is produced. The update function of the LFSR is given by the equation 
where A is some fixed subset of {0, 1, 2, . . . , n − 1}.
Fig. 1. Structure of Stream Cipher in Grain Family
One may note that given any arbitrary state and the information about its evolution (the number of clocks in KSA or PRGA), one can calculate the corresponding state S K 0 at the beginning of the KSA. This is because the state update functions in both the KSA and PRGA in the Grain family are one-to-one and invertible. Hence one can construct the KSA −1 routine that given an input 2n bit vector denoting the internal state of the cipher at the end of the KSA, returns the 2n bit vector giving internal state of the cipher at the beginning of the KSA. One can similarly describe a PRGA −1 routine that inverts one round of the PRGA.
As we will consider Grain v1 for our attack description, let us describe it now. In Grain v1, the size of Key is n = 80 bits and the IV is of size m = 64 bits. The pad used in the KLA is P = 0xFFFF. The LFSR update rule is given by y t+80 = y t+62 +y t+51 +y t+38 +y t+23 +y t+13 +y t . The NFSR state is updated as 
Broad Idea of the Generic Differential Fault Attack
In this section we will describe the generic fault attack idea on any cipher with the physical structure of the Grain family, i.e. a cipher in which there is an nbit LFSR driving an n-bit NFSR. The LFSR and NFSR are being updated by feedback functions f, g respectively and the output keystream bit at each round is generated by an output function of the internal state, i.e., a function of certain locations from both the LFSR and the NFSR. The main nonlinear part of the output function is the 5-variable function h and we study this function carefully.
For this, let us first describe a few issues related to Boolean functions. The readers may have a look at [26] and the references therein for detailed background on Boolean functions. A q-variable Boolean function is a mapping from the set {0, 1} q to the set {0, 1}. Apart from the truth table, another important way to represent a Boolean function is by its Algebraic Normal Form (ANF). A qvariable Boolean function h(x 1 , . . . , x q ) can be considered to be a multivariate polynomial over GF (2) . This polynomial can be expressed as a sum of products representation of all distinct k-th order products (0 ≤ k ≤ q) of the variables. More precisely, h(x 1 , . . . , x q ) can be written as
where the coefficients a 0 , a ij , . . . , a 12...q ∈ {0, 1}. This is the ANF representation of h. The number of variables in the highest order product term with nonzero coefficient is called the algebraic degree, or simply the degree of h and denoted by deg(h). Functions of degree at most one are called affine functions. Given the above background, let us present the following definition.
Definition 1. Consider a q-variable Boolean function F . A non-zero vector α ∈ {0, 1}
q is said to be an affine differential of
an affine function. A Boolean function is said to be affine differential resistant if it does not have any affine differential.
We propose to recover the secret key used in the cipher by observing and analyzing the difference between the fault-free and faulty keystreams. Our attack algorithm attempts to recover the internal state of the cipher after the completion of KSA (or equivalently when PRGA is about to begin). Since both the PRGA and the KSA of Grain family is completely invertible, one can then run the KSA −1 routine to determine the secret key K. As we have pointed out earlier, one can obtain a set of linear equations if there exist affine differentials corresponding to the function h and one such corresponding affine function should be on the variables that come from the locations of the LFSR only.
Given this background, the attack will comprise of the following steps:
1. The attacker is allowed to reset the cipher with the original Key-IV and restart cipher operations. 2. The attacker can inject a fault at any one random bit location of the LFSR.
As a result of the fault injection, the binary value in the bit-location (where the fault has been injected) is toggled. The attacker is not allowed to choose the location of the LFSR where he wants to inject the fault. However, the fault in any LFSR bit may be reproduced at any later stage of operation, once injected. 3. Initially the attacker injects a fault (may be more than one in a few cases) in a randomly chosen position of the LFSR and identifies the fault location by comparing the original (fault-free) and faulty keystream. 4. The attacker has full control over the timing of fault injection, i.e., it is possible to inject the fault precisely at any stage of the cipher operation. Thus, knowing the fault location, (i) it is possible to restart the cipher operations with the original Key-IV, (ii) inject further faults in the same location (in our case either two or four faults) at specific PRGA rounds. 5. In this case, by comparing the original (fault-free) and faulty keystream in certain PRGA rounds, we obtain linear equations with respect to the LFSR state bits at the beginning of the PRGA. We run the fault attack suitable number of times so that we have several such linear equations and solving them we get the LFSR state. It is possible to obtain the linear equations (and thus to solve them efficiently) due to certain property of the Boolean function h. 6. Similarly as above, comparing the original (fault-free) and faulty keystream in certain other PRGA rounds, we obtain linear equations with respect to the NFSR bits at certain PRGA round and thus get back the NFSR state at the beginning of the PRGA. One can then run the KSA −1 routine to determine the secret key K.
In the next section we detail this algorithm with respect to Grain v1.
Differential Fault Analysis: Case Study with Grain v1
Our attack is generic and it works for any version of the Grain family. For Grain-128 our attack works in a similar broad framework as in [5] , though the exact details of the signatures, construction of linear equations and the way of exploiting the Boolean functions need to follow the method we describe below. Since the existing works [5, 19] will not work on Grain v1 due to comparatively complicated output function h, we concentrate on this version as a case study to explain our novel approach. Further, we would like to point out that to the best of our knowledge there is no existing fault attack on Grain v1 available in literature. Moreover, our attack strategy works on any generic Grain like structure and points out the importance of properly choosing the Boolean functions and the LFSR, NFSR locations that will be fed into the functions.
Obtaining the Location of the Fault
Our attack model assumes that the attacker is allowed to toggle the value at exactly one random location of the LFSR. The attacker, however can not explicitly choose the location where the fault is to be injected. In order for the attack to succeed, it is very important that it will be possible to identify the location of the LFSR where the fault has been induced.
Some Definitions and Notations. Let S 0 ∈ {0, 1}
160 be the initial state of the Grain v1 PRGA, and S 0,Δ φ be the initial state resulting after injecting fault
] be the first l keystream bits produced by S 0 and S 0,Δ φ respectively. The task for the fault location identification routine is to determine the fault location φ by analyzing the difference between Z and Z φ . Initially we have taken the value of l = 80. After describing the fault location identification strategy in detail, we will study the value of l more critically.
We define an 80 bit vector E φ over GF(2) whose i th element E φ (i) is the logical XNOR (complement of XOR) of the i th elements of Z and Z φ , i.e., E φ (i) = 1 + z i + z The Sgn φ Pattern. Note that whenever Sgn φ (i) is 1 this implies that the i th keystream bit produced by S 0 and S 0,Δ φ is equal for all choices of S 0 . Calculating the Signature vectors by this method is a computationally infeasible task. We will describe a method to calculate them efficiently as below.
For Grain v1, two initial states of the PRGA S 0 , S 0,Δ79 ∈ {0, 1} 160 which differ only in the 79 th position of the LFSR, produce identical output bits in 68 specific positions among the initial 80 keystream bits produced during the PRGA. If an input differential is introduced in the 79 th LFSR position, then at all rounds numbered k ∈ [0, 79] \ {15, 33, 44, 51, 54, 57, 62, 69, 72, 73, 75, 76}, the difference exists in positions that do not provide input to the Boolean function h and hence at these clocks the keystream bit produced by the two states are essentially the same. At all other clock rounds the difference appears at positions which provide input to h. Hence the keystream produced at these clocks may be different. Following the explanation given above, we can write Sgn 79 in hexadecimal notation, Sgn 79 = FFFE FFFF BFF7 EDBD FB27, which has 80 − 12 = 68 many 1's and rest 0's.
Generalizing the above idea, for two PRGA initial states S 0 , S 0,Δ φ ∈ {0, 1} 160 which differ only in the φ th LFSR location, an analysis of the differential trails shows that out of the first 80 keystream bits produced by them, the bits at a certain fixed rounds are guaranteed to be equal. Thus by performing the above analysis for all fault locations φ (0 ≤ φ ≤ 79), it is possible to calculate all the Signature vectors. A table containing the vectors for each fault location φ is available in Table 1 . Steps for Location Identification. As mentioned above, the task for the fault identification routine is to determine the value of φ given the vector E φ . For any element V ∈ {0, 1} l define the set
Now we check the elements in B E φ . By definition, these are the PRGA rounds i during which z i = z φ i . By the definition of Signature vector proposed above, we know that for the correct value of φ, B Sgn φ ⊆ B E φ and hence Sgn φ E φ . So our strategy would be to search all the Signature vectors and formulate the candidate set Ψ 0 = {ψ : 0 ≤ ψ ≤ 79, Sgn ψ E φ }. If |Ψ 0 | is 1, then the single element in Ψ 0 will give us the fault location φ. However, this may not necessarily be the case always. If Ψ 0 has more than one element, we will be unable to decide conclusively at this stage.
In such a scenario we reset the cipher with the original Key-IV and this time apply the fault at the same location φ at the beginning of the 80 Length of Signature Vector. In the idea given above, we have considered the length of the signature vector l = 80. It may be noted that that fault identification routine is also possible if we increase or decrease the length of the signature vector. So what guidelines must be followed to choose an optimal signature length. Intuitively the following considerations seem to be useful.
1. The signature vector must be long enough so as to uniquely identify the fault location applying one or more faults. 2. The length of the signature vector must be such that the average number of faults required to identify the fault location can be minimized.
We shall see how each of the above considerations affect the choice of the length l of the Signature vector. For example, by simply looking at the Signature vectors (one may refer to 
Further, we have to choose some l ≥ 45 so that the average number of faults, for determining the fault location uniquely, can be minimized. Finding, this optimal value of l mathematically is a difficult task, and hence we choose to determine the optimal value by performing computer simulations. By taking the average over 2 20 uniformly randomly chosen Key-IV pairs for Grain v1, for every signature length l ≥ 45 we get the curve of Average number of faults μ l vs Length of Signature l given in Figure 2 .
We can see that after l = 80, μ l = 1.08 becomes almost constant for increasing values of l. So the length of the Signature vector has been chosen to be 80 bits.
A similar analysis for Grain-128 shows that the minimum Signature length must be greater than or equal to 62. For l = 128, the value of μ l is around 1.001.
Determining the LFSR Internal State
Once the fault location φ has been identified we can proceed towards determining the LFSR internal state at the beginning of the PRGA. Depending on the value of φ we do one of the following.
-If 0 ≤ φ ≤ 37, we disregard the faulty keystream bits, and reset the cipher and look to hit another LFSR location. -If 38 ≤ φ ≤ 41, we reset the cipher and apply faults at the location φ at the beginning of PRGA rounds 0, 20 and record the faulty keystream bits at certain specific PRGA rounds. We then reset the cipher and look to hit another LFSR location. -If 42 ≤ φ ≤ 79, we reset the cipher and apply faults at the location φ at the beginning of PRGA rounds 0, 20 and record the faulty keystream bits at certain specific PRGA rounds. We reset the cipher again and apply faults at the location φ at the beginning of PRGA rounds 204, 224 and record the faulty keystream bits at certain other specific PRGA rounds. We then reset the cipher and look to hit another LFSR location -We continue this process till all LFSR locations 38 to 79 have been hit.
We would like to point out that each double fault (injected at PRGA rounds 0, 20 or 204, 224) yields one linear equation in the initial LFSR state bits of the PRGA. By injecting 2 faults in the 4 LFSR locations 38 to 41 and 4 faults in the 38 LFSR locations 42 to 79, we obtain a set of 80 independent linear equations in the initial LFSR state bits, which can be solved to get the entire LFSR state at the start of the PRGA. The faulty keystream bits recorded in this phase will be again used to recover the NFSR internal state as will be explained in Section 3.3. Before describing the attack in detail let us state the following symbolic notations that we shall be using henceforth. 4 corresponds to the NFSR location 63. This implies that if two internal states S and S Δ be such that they differ in LFSR locations 3, 25 and NFSR location 63 and in no other location that contributes inputs to the output keystream bit, then the difference of the keystream bit produced by them will be equal to the value in LFSR location 46. Getting differentials at exactly these 3 locations may be difficult by injecting a single fault, but may be achieved if we faulted the same LFSR location twice, as will be explained by the following lemma. Since the matrix L and its inverse can be pre-computed beforehand, the vector Y = L −1 W can be calculated immediately after applying the faults and calculating W .
Some Notations
1. S t = [x t 0 , x t 1 ,
Lemma 2. If a fault is injected in LFSR location
Note that for the second round of fault injections the choice of fault locations 42 ≤ φ ≤ 79 and PRGA rounds 204, 224 is by no means unique. By searching over various values of λ, one may be able to obtain a set of linearly independent equations for other choices of fault locations and PRGA rounds.
Remark 1.
If the function h in Grain v1 had been affine differential resistant, then such linear equations could not have been formed. Instead one had to consider a set of nonlinear equations to get Y . As referred in [19] , solving such nonlinear equations is more challenging task and in that case the fault attack we describe here would have been less efficient. The method works in a similar manner for Grain-128 and Grain-128a. 
Determining the NFSR Internal State
Once the LFSR internal state of the initial PRGA round is known, one can then proceed to determine the NFSR internal state. In [4] it was shown, that this could have been done efficiently for the initial version of the cipher i.e. Grain v0. After the attack in [4] was reported, the designers made the necessary changes to Grain v1, Grain-128 and Grain-128a so that for these new ciphers, determining the NFSR state form the knowledge of the LFSR state was no longer straightforward. In order to determine the NFSR bits, we look into the decomposition of the Boolean function h in more detail. The attack we will describe in this section can be mounted due to the following observations on the Grain output function h. ) . Since the LFSR internal state is already available, c t can be computed immediately, and hence the difference of the two keystream bits plus the value of c t gives us the value at the NFSR location 63 at round t of the PRGA. In the next Lemma, we shall investigate when this differential pattern in the internal state is obtained by employing the same fault injection strategy in the previous subsection.
A. h(·) can be written in the form
s j · u(·) + v(·)
Remark 2.
If the function h in Grain v1 were such that it could not be decomposed into u and v as above, then the attack would not have been as straightforward. The attack here is efficient as u and v are of certain nice structures and their inputs are from LFSR bits only. The LFSR bits are already known after the recovery of the LFSR bits and that helps in recovering the NFSR state easily. It can be checked that the output function of Grain-128 and Grain-128a also follows properties (A), (B), (C) given at the beginning of this section and thus renders them vulnerable to this attack.
Finding the Secret Key and Complexity of the Attack
It is known that the KSA and PRGA routines in the Grain family are invertible. Once we have all the bits of S 103 , by running the inverse PRGA routine 103 times, we obtain the initial PRGA state S 0 . Thereafter, by running the inverse KSA routine one can recover the secret key.
The attack complexity directly depends on the number of fault experiments to be performed such that all of locations in [38, 79] of the LFSR are covered. To have this, the expected number of fault experiments is 80
In each fault experiment, the fault identification routine requires μ l faults and simulation results show that the expected value of μ l is 1.08. Further depending on the LFSR location hit, during the attack phase, one needs to inject 2 or 4 extra faults for determining the internal state. Therefore, the expected number of faults that our attack needs is 344 × (1.08) + 4 × 38 + 2 × 4 ≈ 2 9.05 . To determine the internal state, we have to perform one matrix multiplication, and solve a set of 78 linear equations and then exhaustively search over 2 variables. After that, 103 invocations of the PRGA −1 routine and a single invocation of the KSA −1 routine are needed to determine the Secret Key. Thus the dominant time/memory consuming process in our attack is the multiplication of L −1 W which requires around 80 × 80 bits to store L −1 and 12.6 ) bit operations to calculate the product. Further storing the Sgn φ patterns also requires 80 × 80 bits as described in Table 1 .
As stated before, this is the first reported fault attack on Grain v1. Two fault attacks [5, 19] have been reported against Grain-128 and that is the reason direct comparison is not possible. However, one may note that our resource requirements are either favorable or comparable to that of [5, 19] .
Countermeasure: Choice of Proper Boolean Function
In [5] , it was suggested that one of the methods to prevent such fault attacks was to keep two identical implementations of both the shift registers in the cipher hardware. Naturally this needs additional hardware.
One important question here is what are the reasons such that the fault attack can be efficiently implemented. We have already seen that the source of the weakness lies with the output Boolean function h. Our attack is possible as there exists the vector α = [1, 1, 0, 0, 1] such that h(s) + h(s + α) is an affine Boolean function. This function h, used in Grain v1, is clearly not affine differential resistant. In [15] , the designers clearly specify the reasons for choosing this particular output function.
"This filter function is chosen to be balanced, correlation immune of the first order and has algebraic degree 3. The nonlinearity is the highest possible for these functions, namely 12."
In view of the fault attack presented here, we need affine differential resistant functions with the same parameters. One may refer to [26] Proper cryptographic choice of h with possibly higher number of variables with efficient implementation in terms of low gate counts is an important open question. Further, we should also note that the decomposition of h in u, v that possess properties (A), (B), (C) given in Section 3.3 helps in mounting an efficient fault attack. We further note that the function F described above does not satisfy property (B) if s 4 is the only variable that takes input from an NFSR location. This implies that even if the initial LFSR state of the PRGA is made known to the attacker, the attacker will be unable to apply the attack given in Section 3.3 to the function F .
Conclusion
In this paper we have described a differential fault attack that works on all the versions of Grain. Such attacks were studied earlier on Grain-128 in [5, 19] . However, the attacks could not be mounted on Grain v1 due to the different structure of the output function h(·). Here we show that the function of Grain v1 too has some weakness in terms of having affine differentials. By this we mean that there exists certain suitable α such that h(x)+h(x+α) is linear. Our attack works due to this observation and corresponding choices of the taps from the LFSR. That is, from a general perspective, the differential fault attack can be mounted on Grain like structures even with Boolean functions of higher degree. We also provide examples of functions that are affine differential resistant and suggest use of such functions in Grain family as a countermeasure. Our work provides clear direction in choosing the output Boolean function and its inputs from the locations of the LFSR and the NFSR.
